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Feb 2026
1) HPX went dark across products for a full trading week
8Cleared volume and MCP printed as 0.00 across RTM for 2026-01-26 to 2026-02-01.
Inference: This looks like no-trade / no-publication rather than low liquidity, because every daily row is zeroed.
Why it matters: A “blank” week breaks cross-exchange price discovery and weakens any congestion/price attribution story.
2) IEX HPDAM showed sellers queued, but not a single buyer cleared
8HPDAM posted sell bids ~124,358–133,022 MWh/day through the week, but MCV and final scheduled volume stayed 0.00 every day.
Inference: Persistent one-sided sell interest without matching bids suggests either price expectations gap or product-level participation failure.
Why it matters: HPDAM cannot signal hydro/flex scarcity if it never clears; it becomes “intent” data, not a market outcome.
3) Day-ahead to real-time flipped sharply positive on 2026-01-31
8On 2026-01-31, IEX DAM MCP = 2821.20 Rs/MWh while RTM MCP = 3399.37 Rs/MWh (basis +578.17 Rs/MWh).
Inference: Such a late-day premium is consistent with tighter balancing needs vs day-ahead expectations, especially when frequency discipline is stressed.
Why it matters: A near Rs 0.58/kWh basis can quickly inflate balancing costs for buyers who under-covered day-ahead.
4) Ancillary down-dispatch dominated 2026-02-01 balancing energy
8TRAS Down = -41,945 MWh on 2026-02-01, with average TRAS+SRAS = -1,543 MW across the day.
Inference: The system leaned more on downward balancing, pointing to surplus/over-schedule pockets rather than scarcity.
Why it matters: Down-dispatch at this scale changes who pays/earns in balancing, and it can distort real-time price signals.
5) Zero ATC/(N-1) breaches, yet a 765-kV corridor saw repeated voltage excursions
8For 2026-02-01, ATC and (N-1) violation counts are 0 on all listed corridors, but Chittorgarh shows 8.13% time outside IEGC band.
Inference: Corridor transfer headroom can look “clean” while local voltage control still strains-two different risk surfaces.
Why it matters: Voltage excursions are operational risk even when transfer indices say “no constraint.”
6) Frequency softened from Friday to Sunday, with deeper low-end touchpoints
8Average frequency moved from 50.008 Hz (2026-01-30) to 49.992 Hz (2026-02-01); minimum instantaneous on 2026-02-01 hit 49.693 Hz.
Inference: The shift is small in average terms but the tail risk (deep dips) is what forces tighter balancing actions.
Why it matters: More low-end exposure increases deviation risk for states and raises the system’s need for fast reserves.
7) Southern region reported zero shortage, but deviations diverged across states
8On 2026-02-01, SR evening peak demand 45,803 MW was met with 0 MW shortage, yet state UI energy shows Tamil Nadu -3.72 MU and Karnataka -1.49 MU.
Inference: Zero-shortage can coexist with state-level deviation behaviour-the balancing burden shifts internally rather than showing as shortage.
Why it matters: Persistent negative/positive UI pockets can become the hidden driver of reserve deployment and settlement friction.
8) A zero-stock captive unit still appears inside the national coal ledger
8On 2026-01-31, SHREE CEMENT LTD TPS (344 MW) shows Actual Stock = 0.0 (‘000 tonnes) and Stock vs normative = 0%.
Inference: Even if it’s not a grid-critical ISGS station, zero-stock pockets can worsen local drawal volatility when captive demand flips to the grid.
Why it matters: It’s a small-unit signal, but it’s the kind that turns into sudden demand shocks in tight hours.
Click on Details for more Details
8Cleared volume and MCP printed as 0.00 across RTM for 2026-01-26 to 2026-02-01.
Inference: This looks like no-trade / no-publication rather than low liquidity, because every daily row is zeroed.
Why it matters: A “blank” week breaks cross-exchange price discovery and weakens any congestion/price attribution story.
2) IEX HPDAM showed sellers queued, but not a single buyer cleared
8HPDAM posted sell bids ~124,358–133,022 MWh/day through the week, but MCV and final scheduled volume stayed 0.00 every day.
Inference: Persistent one-sided sell interest without matching bids suggests either price expectations gap or product-level participation failure.
Why it matters: HPDAM cannot signal hydro/flex scarcity if it never clears; it becomes “intent” data, not a market outcome.
3) Day-ahead to real-time flipped sharply positive on 2026-01-31
8On 2026-01-31, IEX DAM MCP = 2821.20 Rs/MWh while RTM MCP = 3399.37 Rs/MWh (basis +578.17 Rs/MWh).
Inference: Such a late-day premium is consistent with tighter balancing needs vs day-ahead expectations, especially when frequency discipline is stressed.
Why it matters: A near Rs 0.58/kWh basis can quickly inflate balancing costs for buyers who under-covered day-ahead.
4) Ancillary down-dispatch dominated 2026-02-01 balancing energy
8TRAS Down = -41,945 MWh on 2026-02-01, with average TRAS+SRAS = -1,543 MW across the day.
Inference: The system leaned more on downward balancing, pointing to surplus/over-schedule pockets rather than scarcity.
Why it matters: Down-dispatch at this scale changes who pays/earns in balancing, and it can distort real-time price signals.
5) Zero ATC/(N-1) breaches, yet a 765-kV corridor saw repeated voltage excursions
8For 2026-02-01, ATC and (N-1) violation counts are 0 on all listed corridors, but Chittorgarh shows 8.13% time outside IEGC band.
Inference: Corridor transfer headroom can look “clean” while local voltage control still strains-two different risk surfaces.
Why it matters: Voltage excursions are operational risk even when transfer indices say “no constraint.”
6) Frequency softened from Friday to Sunday, with deeper low-end touchpoints
8Average frequency moved from 50.008 Hz (2026-01-30) to 49.992 Hz (2026-02-01); minimum instantaneous on 2026-02-01 hit 49.693 Hz.
Inference: The shift is small in average terms but the tail risk (deep dips) is what forces tighter balancing actions.
Why it matters: More low-end exposure increases deviation risk for states and raises the system’s need for fast reserves.
7) Southern region reported zero shortage, but deviations diverged across states
8On 2026-02-01, SR evening peak demand 45,803 MW was met with 0 MW shortage, yet state UI energy shows Tamil Nadu -3.72 MU and Karnataka -1.49 MU.
Inference: Zero-shortage can coexist with state-level deviation behaviour-the balancing burden shifts internally rather than showing as shortage.
Why it matters: Persistent negative/positive UI pockets can become the hidden driver of reserve deployment and settlement friction.
8) A zero-stock captive unit still appears inside the national coal ledger
8On 2026-01-31, SHREE CEMENT LTD TPS (344 MW) shows Actual Stock = 0.0 (‘000 tonnes) and Stock vs normative = 0%.
Inference: Even if it’s not a grid-critical ISGS station, zero-stock pockets can worsen local drawal volatility when captive demand flips to the grid.
Why it matters: It’s a small-unit signal, but it’s the kind that turns into sudden demand shocks in tight hours.
Click on Details for more Details
